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Although some writers1 are critical of the International Civil
Aviation Organization's (ICAO) adjudicative role in the settle-
ment of disputes, the authors believe the ICAO's adjudicatory
machinery plays an effective role in the settlement of disputes.
To aid in understanding the effectiveness of the ICAO in the
settlement of disputes, this article examines the development, or-
ganizational structure, and purpose of the ICAO and considers
the machinery for the settlement of disputes, including a discussion
of the procedural weaknesses, political implications, history of dis-
pute settlements, and the ICAO's mediation role.
I. THE ICAO: DEVELOPMENT, ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTION
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) came
into existence on April 4, 1947, when the Convention on Inter-
* Mr. Gariepy, a member of the California, District of Columbia and New
York Bars, is General Counsel to Garnac Grain Co., Inc.
** Mr. Botsford is a Leading Articles Editor of the Journal of Air Law and
Commerce.
I One author, after emphasizing the inherent weaknesses in the ICAO ad-
judicative machinery stated: "It is for consideration whether the Council should
not be relieved of the burden of judicial functions which, by its very structure,
it can carry out only with very great difficulty." Fitzgerald, The Judgment of
the International Court of Justice on the Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of
the ICAO, 1974 CAN. Y.B. 153, 185 [hereinafter cited as Fitzgerald]. Another
writer has referred to the ICAO Council as an unsuitable body to exercise its
judicial function. B. CHENG, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL AiR TRANSPORT, 460
(1962) [hereinafter cited as CHENG].
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national Civil Aviation (Convention)' became effective. The Con-
vention was a result of the International Civil Aviation Conference
(Conference) which met in Chicago, Illinois, in 1944 to adopt
international agreements on commercial air traffic rights and both
technical and navigational matters of international aviation.
The Conference drafted two agreements: The International Air
Services Transit Agreement (Transit Agreement)' and the Inter-
national Air Transport Agreement (Transport Agreement)." The
Transit Agreement provides for the reciprocal exchange of the
privilege of flying across each contracting state's territory and the
privilege of landing for non-traffic purposes The Transport Agree-
ment, on the other hand, provides for the two privileges in the
Transit Agreement and recognizes three additional privileges:
(1) the privilege to put down passengers, mail and cargo taken
on in the territory of the State whose nationality the aircraft pos-
sesses; (2) the privilege to take on passengers, mail and cargo
destined for the territory of the State whose nationality the aircraft
possesses; and (3) the privilege to take on passengers, mail and
cargo destined for the territory of any other contracting State and
the privilege to put down passengers, mail and cargo coming from
any such territory.6
In addition to the Transit and Transport Agreements," the Con-
ference adopted an Interim Agreement on International Civil
Aviation that established the Provisional International Civil
2The Convention on International Civil Aviation, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No.
1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Convention].
SThe International Air Services Transit Agreement, 59 Stat. 1693, E.A.S.
No. 487, 84 U.N.T.S. 389 (1951), entered into force on January 30, 1945.
[hereinafter cited as Transit Agreement]
4 The International Air Transport Agreement, 59 Stat. 1701, E.A.S. No. 488,
171 U.N.T.S. 387 (1953). [hereinafter cited as Transport Agreement]
' Transit Agreement, Art. I, § 1. See generally, W. WAGNER, INTERNATIONAL
AIR TRANSPORTATION AS AFFECTED BY STATE SOVEREIGNTY 140-42 (1970). Note
also that the privileges of this agreement are limited when an airport is used
exclusively for military operations, in areas of "active hostilities or of military
occupation," and such privileges are subject to the military authorities of any
country during periods of war. Id.
6 Transport Agreement, Art. I, § 1.
According to WAGNER, supra note 5, at 140, 143, over seventy States have
accepted the Transit Agreement, while only twelve have accepted the Transport
Agreement. For an excellent discussion of membership in the ICAO and prob-
lems related thereto, see T. BUERGENTHAL, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION 13-35 (1969) [hereinafter cited as BUERGENTHAL].
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Aviation Organization (PICAO). PICAO, in turn, planned the
technical program and administrative structure for the permanent
ICAO in the period preceding the entry into force of the Con-
vention."
The basic functions of the ICAO are: to develop the principles
and techniques of international air navigation; to foster the planning
and development of international air transport to insure the safe
and orderly growth of international civil aviation throughout the
world; to encourage the development of airways, airports, and air
navigation facilities for international civil aviation; to promote the
development of all aspects of international civil aeronautics; and
to provide for safe, efficient and economical air transport.'
The ICAO discharges its functions through an Assembly, Coun-
cil, and various subsidiary bodies."0 Each member state is rep-
resented in the Assembly which reviews the activities of the ICAO
and establishes its general policy guidelines. The Assembly meets
at least once every three years and has the power "to deal with any
matter within the sphere of action of the Organization not
specifically assigned to the Council."11 Each representative state
in the Assembly has a vote,1" and most decisions of the Assembly
are adopted by a majority of the votes cast when a quorum, con-
sisting of a majority of the member states,1" is present.
The Council members, composed of representatives from twenty-
seven member states, are elected for three-year terms.1' The Council,
8 The Convention entered into force on April 4, 1947. For a more detailed
discussion of the preparatory work performed by PICAO see BUERGENTHAL,
supra note 7, at 5.
' See Convention, Art. 44. For a discussion of the ICAO's role, see W. Binag-
hi, The Role of the ICAO, in THE FREEDOM OF THE AiR 17 (E. McWhinney ed.
1968).
10For a discussion of the functions of subsidiary ICAO bodies see CHENG,
supra note 1, at 42-56; BUERGENTHAL, supra note 7, at 7, 9-12.
11 Convention, Art. 49(k).
12 Convention, Art. 48.
13 Id.
14 Convention, Art. 50(a). These members are selected by the Assembly to
fulfill the objectives of Article 50(b) which requires the Assembly to:
give adequate representation to (1) the States of chief importance
in air transport; (2) the States not otherwise included which make
the largest contribution to the provision for facilities for inter-
national civil air navigation; and (3) the States not otherwise in-
cluded whose designation will insure that all the major geographic
areas of the world are represented on the Council.
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described as "the governing board of the ICAO"" performs legisla-
tive, judicial, and administrative functions. The legislative functions
include the adoption of various ICAO air navigation and air
transport regulations; the judicial functions include the power to
adjudicate disputes between the member states relating to the
interpretation and application of the Convention; and the admini-
strative functions include the administration of the finances of the
Organization, the appointment of the Secretary General, the execu-
tion of Assembly directives and the supervision of international
agreements for the joint financing of air navigation facilities and
services."6
II. PROCEDURE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
The Convention and the Transit and Transport Agreements pro-
vide for the settlement of disputes between member states. These
agreements also provide sanctions and procedural Rules for the
Settlement of Disputes (Rules). Under Chapter XVIII, Articles
84-88 of the Convention, the Council is authorized to settle dis-
putes between member states." Article 84 provides the framework
for resolution of disputes."
Article 84, however, raises a number of jurisdictional questions
despite its compulsory nature. 9 Firstly, a distinction between dis-
" See ICAO SECRETARIAT, MEMORANDUM ON ICAO 13 (5th ed. 1966).
18 See generally Convention, Arts. 54 & 55.
17 The proceedings for the settlement and adjudication of disputes are gov-
erned by the Rules for the Settlement of Disputes, ICAO Doe. 7782-c/898
(1959) [hereinafter cited as Rules]. The Rules encompass general rules of pro-
cedure and include the exchange of pleadings, a counter-memorial, a reply by
the applicant state, and the respondent's rejoinder. For a more detailed study of
the Rules, see BUERGENTHAL, supra note 7, at 179-94.
18Article 84 provides that:
If any disagreement between two or more contracting states relating
to the interpretation or application of this Convention and its An-
nexes cannot be settled by negotiation, it shall, on the application
of any state concerned in the disagreement, be decided by the Coun-
cil. No member of the Council shall vote in the consideration by the
Council of any dispute to which it is a party. Any contracting state
may, subject to Article 85, appeal from the decision of the Council
to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal agreed upon with the other parties
to the dispute or to the Permanent Court of International Justice.
Any such appeal shall be notified to the Council within sixty days
of receipt of notification of the decision of the Council.
18CHENG, supra note 1; BUERGENTHAL, supra note 7, at 125. Both note the
compulsory nature of the grant of jurisdiction. It stems from the wording of
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agreements and complaints must be made. Disagreements can
be instigated properly under Article 84 only, while complaints may
be filed pursuant to either Article II, section 1 of the Transit
Agreement or Article IV, section 2 of the Transport Agreement."
Secondly, the disagreement must relate to "the interpretation or ap-
plication of" the Convention or its Annexes."' Thirdly, it must
appear that the dispute "cannot be settled by negotiation."' Lastly,
the dispute must be submitted to the Council by a contracting State
"concerned in the disagreement."' It has been asserted that a con-
tracting state can be "concerned in the disagreement only if said
state is a party to the dispute,"' which appears to be an appropriate
interpretation of the Rules."
Article 84, which states in pertinent part:
If any disagreement . .. cannot be settled by negotiation, it shall,
on the application of any state concerned in the disagreement, be
decided by the Council (emphasis added).
"Note that both the Transit Agreement and Transport Agreement use iden-
tical language, to wit:
A contracting State which deems that action by another contract-
ing State under this Agreement is causing injustice or hardship to
it, may request the Council to examine the situation. The Council
shall thereupon inquire into the matter, and shall call the States
concerned into consultation. Should such consultation fail to resolve
the difficulty, the Council may make appropriate findings and rec-
ommendations to the contracting States concerned. . . . (em-
phasis added).
See also Hingorani, Dispute Settlement In International Civil Aviation, 14 ARB. J.
15-16 nn.ll & 12 (1959). It should also be noted that Article 2 of the Rules
refers to the proper tool for filing a disagreement (as opposed to a complaint) as
an Application containing specifically enumerated details (also referred to as
a Memorial). The essential difference is that a complaint alleges behavior that
is not technically illegal under the Agreements, although the behavior complained
of may cause hardship or injury. See also Note, 14 HARv. INT'L L. J. 612, 615
(1973).
21 Convention, Art. 84.
"Id. In this connection, see Rules, Art. 2(g); BUERGENTHAL, supra note 7,
at 130-36.
"See Convention, Art. 84.
2' BUERGENTHAL, supra note 7, at 128-29 states that this is an implicit re-
quirement of Article 84, since the second requirement "presupposes that the
applicant state has previously addressed to the respondent, .. . a legal claim
that the latter has refused to honor" (citation omitted). The author goes on to
discuss the 1952 India-Pakistan dispute concerning an Article 84 disagreement,
as precedent for his point. There, Afghanistan filed charges against Pakistan
identical to those India had made against Pakistan pursuant to Article 84. The
Council did not consider Afghanistan's charges as an Article 84 disagreement,
stating that a more detailed and explicit statement of its disagreement was neces-
sary. Id. at 129. See also, ICAO Doc. 7291-c/845 at 195 (1952).
'See Rules, Art. 2(a)-(g).
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The Council is required to reach a decision in accordance with
the Rules." The decision must be in writing,'" and dissents are
allowed.28 Of course, no Council member may vote in the decision
of any dispute to which it is a party."' The Council's decision may
be appealed either to the International Court of Justice or to an
ad hoc international tribunal."' In either case the judgment of the
body selected is final and binding."
The Convention also provides for two sanctions. The first sanc-
tion applies when the Council renders a final decision that an air-
line has not complied with a previous decision. Each member of
the ICAO then must bar the airline from operating through the
airspace above its territory.' The second sanction applies when
a contracting state is found in default under Chapter XVIII of
the Convention. The Assembly must suspend the member's voting
power in the Assembly and the Council."
The Transit and Transport Agreements provide the same pro-
cedure for the settlement of disputes as does the Convention.'
If any disagreement between two or more contracting states relating
to the interpretation or application of this Agreement cannot be
settled by negotiation, the provisions of Chapter XVIII of the ...
Convention shall be applicable in the same manner as provided
therein with reference to any disagreement relating to the interpre-
tation or application of the... Convention.'
With respect to sanctions, the Transit and Transport Agreements
both provide that, after the Council has made appropriate findings
and recommendations, "[I]f thereafter a contracting State concerned
shall in the opinion of the Council unreasonably fail to take suitable
corrective action, the Council may recommend to the Assembly...
"See Rules, Arts. 5-15.
27 Rules, Art. 15(2).
"Rules, Art. 15(3).
"Rules, Art. 15(5).
"0Convention, Arts. 84, 85.
31 Convention, Art. 86.
"Convention, Art. 87.
"Convention, Art. 88.
4 Although the same procedure is available, it should be noted that the ad-
judicatory machinery provided for under the Transit and Transport Agreements
presents certain problem areas. See BUERGENTHAL, supra note 7, at 155-58.
"Transit Agreement, Art. II, § 2; Transport Agreement, Art. IV, 5 3.
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that such contracting State be suspended from its rights and priv-
ileges under this Agreement until such action has been taken."'
III. PAST DISPUTES
The ICAO has seldom been asked to settle international aviation
disputes. In fact, the Council has been requested to consider only
three disputes under Chapter XVIII of the Convention. The
first dispute occurred between India and Pakistan in 1952 and
concerned the interpretation and application of the Convention."
India brought the issue before the Council, and the dispute was
settled by negotiation between the parties. The resulting settlement
was recorded in an agreement filed with the ICAO Secretariat.'
The second dispute arose between the United Kingdom and
Spain in 1967 concerning a prohibited area in the vicinity of
Gibraltar.3 ' Although the matter was brought before the Council,
consideration of the dispute was deferred indefinitely at the request
of the parties in 1969.'
The third dispute, again between India and Pakistan came before
the ICAO Council on March 3, 19711 and was fully adjudicated
there. After an appeal was taken on the issue of the Council's
jurisdiction over the dispute, the International Court of Justice
upheld the Council's determination that it was vested with jurisdic-
tion in the case.'
That only one dispute has been fully adjudicated by the ICAO
does not indicate that the adjudicatory machinery is ineffective;
N Transit Agreement, Art. II, § 1; Transport Agreement, Art. IV, § 2. See
note 19 supra.
"The disagreement stemmed from the proper interpretation and application
of Articles 5, 6 and 9 of the Convention and Transit Agreement. See ICAO,
Reporteur's Guide to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Article 84-2,
ICAO Doe. 8900 (1971).
3' For a discussion of this disagreement, see BUERGENTHAL, supra note 7, at
123-97. Note also that at the date of this dispute, the Rules were not in force.
"' This dispute involved the application and interpretation of Article 9 of the
Convention [Chapter II, Flight over Territory of Contracting States, Art. 9-
military exceptions and qualifications of the general provisions].
4
' ACTION OF THE COUNCIL OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AvIATION ORGANI-
ZATION, 68th Session, ICAO Doe. 8903C/994 at 27 (1969).
41 For a detailed analysis of this dispute, see Fitzgerald, supra note 1. See
also Note, 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 612 (1973).
' 1972 I.C.J. Rep. 46.
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only that states prefer to settle disputes by diplomacy rather than
by adjudication.' Adjudication clearly has disadvantages not found
in the diplomatic settlement of disputes: adjudication may result
in protracted and costly litigation; the parties are not in complete
control of the dispute; unwanted publicity may result; and an
adverse decision may have more unfavorable results than a nego-
tiated settlement.
IV. THE ICAO AS MEDIATOR
Although Article 84 of the Convention explicitly charges the
Council with the authority to decide disputes, the language clearly
points out that the Council shall do so only when such disputes
"cannot be settled by negotiation."" Article 6(1) of the Rules
also emphasizes the Council's role as a mediator:
[T]he Council may, at any time during the proceedings and prior
to the meeting at which the decision is rendered... invite the
parties to the dispute to engage in direct negotiations, if the Coun-
cil deems that the possibilities of settling the dispute or narrowing
the issues through negotiations have not been exhausted.
Furthermore, Article 14(3) of the Rules authorizes the Council
to "render any assistance likely to further the negotiations, includ-
ing the designation of an individual or a group of individuals to
act as conciliator during the negotiations."
The Jordan v. United Arab Republic (UAR) dispute demon-
strates the ICAO's role as mediator. When the dispute arose, the
Council was asked to intervene. ' Although the parties relied on
the Convention, they never formally invoked the jurisdiction of the
Council under Chapter XVIII. It is remarkable that the Council
did not request the parties to adjudicate their dispute under the
Convention, but rather asked only for more information on their
' A writer took note of this fact with respect to air transport agreements.
He stated that:
Although most of the nine hundred and forty air transport agree-
ments in force between states provide for arbitration as a means
for the settlement of disputes, there have only been two arbitration
proceedings in relation to those agreements. . . . Bradley, Inter-
national Air Cargo Services: The Italy-U.S.A. Air Transport Agree-
ment Arbitration, 12 McGILL L.J. 312 (1966).
Convention, Art. 84. See note 15, supra.
'See ICAO Doc. C-WP/2661 at 5 (1958).
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respective positions. The Council induced the parties to enter into
extensive discussions,'6 and a settlement was finally reached with-
out invoking the adjudicatory machinery of Chapter XVIII." This
resolution was consistent with one commentator's statement that
[t]he primary role which the Council thus performs in dealing with
complaints is to provide a forum where difficulties between Con-
tracting States can be ironed out in an institutional setting that is
particularly well suited for compromise solutions."
Thus, it appears that the most important function the ICAO per-
forms is mediation. Without the adjudicatory machinery, however,
it is doubtful that the mediatorial services the ICAO performs
would be as effective.
V. PROCEDURAL IRREGULARITIES
Since the second India v. Pakistan"' matter is the only case fully
adjudicated before the ICAO, an examination of its procedural
irregularities is helpful in a critical examination of the Council's
procedural adjudicative machinery. India requested the Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ) to declare the decision of the
Council illegal, alleging that "the manner and method employed
by the Council in reaching its decision render the decision im-
proper, unfair and prejudicial to India, and bad in law."" The
ICJ, however, stated that the alleged procedural irregularities did
not materially prejudice the case."
Several procedural irregularities were observed during the ICAO
adjudication. Firstly, some Council members were not present for
the entire oral hearings, yet they were allowed to join in the
Council's decision without having read a transcript of the complete
oral testimony." In addition, although neither party to the dispute
For a general discussion of these negotiations see BUERGENTHAL, supra
note 7, at 162-64.
41 See Fitzgerald, supra note 1, at 153.
"' See Buergenthal, supra note 7, at 162.
4'See Fitzgerald, supra note 1, at 175-82; Note, 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 612
(1973).
50I.C.J. Rep. 49 (1972).
"Id., 69-70.
"Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council, 1972 I.CJ. Rep.
256-93.
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voted in the final decision, both India and Pakistan were permitted
to intervene and speak during the deliberations which followed the
presentation of oral arguments. 3 While the second irregularity is
not as grave as the first, neither is consistent with usual standards
of due process and fundamental fairness. Lastly, the decision on
the jurisdiction issue consisted merely of voting on propositions
without giving supporting reasons. In a separate opinion, Judge
Petrrn noted, "[I]t is a striking fact that the decision is devoid of
all statement of grounds and consists solely in the declaration to the
effect that the Council did not accept the objection.""
Despite the notation by the ICJ that the procedural irregularities
were not materially prejudicial to the Council's decision, it is readily
apparent that the ICAO needs to revise the Rules to insure adher-
ence to traditional concepts of due process.
VI. THE POLITICAL QUESTION
Although the Council is empowered to act in a judicial capacity,
it is obvious that representatives do not act as individuals. Rather,
each acts on behalf of his member state." This unquestionably
results in settlements based upon political considerations. Mr. Fitz-
Gerald, after pointing out that in the second India v. Pakistan dis-
pute some Council members wanted to defer the decision until they
had received instructions from their governments, has stated:
It is a contradiction in terms to say that a state can be judge. It
is also a contradiction to hold that a representative who receives
instructions from a state as to how he should act with respect to a
particular disagreement could be seen to act judicially."
While it has been asserted that the politically oriented Council
cannot properly fulfill its adjudicatory role, it is important to re-
call that the Council's primary role is that of mediator of disputes:
Most Council Representatives are better qualified to assist the
63 Id.
5'I.C.J. Rep. 84 (1972).
"The Legal Experts Committee of the ICAO has recognized that the struc-
ture of the Council is political rather than judicial. Hingorani, Dispute Settlement
in International Civil Aviation, 14 ARB. J. 14, 20 (1959).
"1 Fitzgerald, supra note 1, at 169.
57 See note 1 supra.
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parties in adjusting their dispute than they are in adjudicating it.
They are appointed to the Council by their governments because
of their technical, administrative, and diplomatic experience in
civil aviation matters. It is often only a coincidence that some of
them happen to have legal training as well. And, since the Council
has very extensive legislative and administrative functions to per-
form, it is not surprising that those serving on it, because of their
training, temperament, and the pressure of their work, are more
interested in having differences resolved than in adjudicating them. 8
Finally, should the Council render a political decision, an aggrieved
party has the right to appeal the decision before a non-political
forum, either the ICJ or an ad hoc international tribunal."
CONCLUSION
The overall effectiveness of the ICAO adjudicative machinery
warrants its continued utilization because, without it, the ICAO's
primary function, mediation, might be seriously eroded. Proce-
dural weaknesses as demonstrated by the India v. Pakistan dis-
pute must be recognized and corrected to provide justice without
dependence upon appellate bodies. The procedural weaknesses
primarily stem from failure to adhere to the Rules, although new
rules could be adopted to remedy defects. Due process, in the sense
of procedural fairness, after all, is the desired result. The weak-
nesses, however, do not appear to be material, although they are
distressing to the discriminating jurist.
Although the ICAO Council is a distinctly political body, allow-
ing political considerations to enter into the adjudicative function is
unsatisfactory. It has been noted, however, that the Council's chief
role is that of a mediator rather than an adjudicator. The 1952
India-Pakistan dispute, the Jordan-UAR action, and the striking
absence of Article 84 actions demonstrates the effective nature of
the ICAO's adjudicatory role. Moreover, an aggrieved party may
appeal a Council's political decision to a non-political adjudicative
body.
The Council is actively engaged in mediation and adjudicates
disputes only when no other recourse is available. The existence of
adjudicative authority vested in the ICAO, however, gives the
"See BUERGENTHAL, supra note 7, at 195.
"See note 30 supra.
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Council additional leverage in negotiating settlements. Without this
leverage disputants would have little inducement from the ICAO
to settle disputes by negotiation."0
Although the ICAO's adjudicative machinery has minor flaws,
when viewed from a proper perspective, the ICAO adjudicative
machinery plays an effective and important role in the settlement
of disputes.
" See section IV and note 43, supra.
